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Whilst models from Hotelling (1929) onwards suggest that firms may minimise horizontal product differentiation, many analyses indicate that firms who engage in price competition will not minimise vertical product differentiation.  Examples of which include papers by Prescott and Visscher (1977), Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979, 1980), Shaked and Sutton (1982), and Donnenfeld and Weber (1992).  The vertical product differentiation result of these papers derives at least partly from the assumptions that consumers differ according to their income levels whilst sharing preferences for high quality as opposed to low quality products, and that advertising is not required to provide consumer information.  

Alternatively, this paper offers one explanation of why, in the face of price competition, firms may in fact minimise vertical product differentiation after all, such that firms producing similar products of comparable quality may cluster in particular areas.  For example, across France, the French have great pride in their reputation for high quality cuisine, with certain regions enjoying a particularly good reputation such as the area in and around Lyon.  Similarly, certain wine producing regions (not only in France but also, for example, in Western Australia) are renowned for the good quality of their wines, and Italian shoe makers are typically well respected.  Further, whilst it is found that firms will often produce identical high quality products, conditions are also identified in the paper under which the production of identical low quality products can be part of the subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SGPN) of the game.  Hence, in some areas it only seems possible to buy basic pub meals or standard takeaway fayre, or shoppers may complain that it seems impossible to buy a good quality shirt, pair of shoes etc.  
It is recognised that there are a number of reasons why firms may minimise vertical product differentiation, such as firms may produce and/or sell products of similar quality as they believe that there is a particularly large demand for goods of that quality in an area, maybe reflecting local consumers’ income levels.  Yet, whilst this may explain why a large number of takeaway establishments are attracted to certain areas, it does not explain, for example, France’s reputation for high quality cuisine, or the quality of wine throughout the Margaret River area of Western Australia.  

The analysis below extends existing research by examining whether the principle of ‘maximal product differentiation’ of the vertical product differentiation literature continues to hold once we relax the assumption that consumers always hold full information about the brands available.  Consequently, firms’ strategy choices not only include prices and quality, but also the extent of informative advertising, such that consumer ignorance can be overcome.  In addition, consumers are assumed to differ according to their preferences for high quality rather than low quality goods, and their willingness to pay for higher quality products, in contrast to the vertical product differentiation literature mentioned above. 

Models incorporating firms’ advertising and product differentiation decisions already exist, for example, Grossman and Shapiro (1984), Bester and Petrakis (1996), LeBlanc (1998), Piga (1998) and Bloch and Manceau (1999).  However, these models focus on horizontal product differentiation, developing Hotelling’s framework.  Alternatively, the analysis below focuses on firms’ vertical product differentiation and advertising decisions.  Nevertheless, the market under consideration is also horizontally differentiated in a simple manner.  As such, the model can be linked to models recently developed of simultaneous horizontal and vertical differentiation, for example, Ferreira and Thisse (1996), although not models exploring multiple characteristics of horizontal or vertical differentiation, such as Garella and Lambertini (1999).





A two stage, duopoly model for a new product is developed, in which the firms independently maximise profits.  Each firm is assumed to be located in a distinct segment of the market.  In this analysis, market segments are assumed to be nearby, but distinct local markets, containing the same number of consumers and identical demand conditions.​[1]​  If a firm chooses to enter the non-local market in which the competing firm is located it does not need to set up a second outlet.  Rather, it is assumed that consumers’ transport costs are negligible, and so can be set equal to zero.  This seems reasonable if, for example, the costs of driving a few extra miles are trivial to consumers.  

Consumers demand zero or one units of the new product, an assumption conventionally adopted in the related literature.  It is assumed that there are only two possible quality levels of the product – high and low.  Higher quality products are sold at a higher price than lower quality brands, reflecting consumers’ greater willingness to pay for higher quality brands.  Firms must advertise product characteristics that otherwise remain unknown to consumers, and each firm must advertise at least in their local market to create positive local demand.​[2]​  Consumers do not go out ‘searching’ for possible new products to buy without the stimulus provided by an advertisement, informing them of the existence of the new product.​[3]​  Nevertheless, price information, even if not contained in advertisements, is easily obtainable.  

Each local advertising campaign involves a sunk cost.  The firms are equally efficient in sending advertising messages and the sunk costs of an advertising campaign are assumed constant.  This can be justified as whilst there are reasons why the sunk cost of an advertising campaign in a non-local market could be larger or smaller than that incurred in a local market, there is no a priori reason why either alternative should be assumed.  The sunk costs of an advertising campaign could be greater in a non-local market if ‘better’ advertising is required to convince consumers to purchase a non-local brand.  Alternatively, more money may have to be invested to discover what constitutes a successful advertising campaign that will reach all consumers in the non-local market of a firm.  However, a second advertising campaign may be less expensive than the first, if advertising economies of scale exist.  

It is also assumed that neither firm has access to superior production methods.  Common constant marginal costs of production are assumed, with no loss of generality in setting this marginal cost equal to zero.  There are no sunk or fixed costs of production.​[4]​  

In the first stage each firm makes an entry decision, and upon entering must decide the quality of product to produce.  In the second stage firms choose the number of local markets in which to sell their product, using informative advertising to alert consumers to the new product in each local market that they enter.  Hence, the SGPN equilibria of the full game involve the optimal selection of product qualities and the number of local markets in which to advertise.  The firms engage in price competition if they face competition in a local market.​[5]​   A firm will wish to price discriminate if it enjoys a monopoly position in its local market, whilst competing in the other locality.  Customers from the non-local market can be charged a more competitive price by including a price reduction voucher as part of the advertising campaign there, for example, as part of direct mail, local newspaper or magazine advertising. 

2.2 CONSUMER PREFERENCES AND DEMAND SPECIFICATIONS
Assume a continuum of consumers uniformly distributed along the unit interval, their position  reflecting their utility U from consuming a product of a particular quality.  Thus, 

where:
 = the premium that a consumer is willing to pay for a high quality brand, ;
subscripts  L,H  = low quality and high quality brands, respectively.
Hence, i represents consumers’ marginal willingness to pay for a product of a particular quality in each local market.

If identical high quality brands are produced, inequality 1 needs to be satisfied if consumer demand throughout the market (both local markets) is to be non-negative:
									(1)
where:
P = price of a brand, .
That is, the net utility from consuming a high quality product should be weakly positive.  Inequality 1 implies that 
Hence, industry demand will be 				(2)
If the firms produce identical low quality brands, a consumer prefers, at least weakly, to purchase a unit of a brand rather than zero if
									(3)
and industry demand will be 					(4)
Note that if the duopolists produce homogeneous products and charge identical prices they will share the market equally.

When deriving each firm’s demand function when quality differentiated brands are produced, a consumer will choose to purchase the high quality good if two conditions simultaneously hold:
Condition 1 is inequality 1 above:
									









The kink in the demand schedule for the high quality brand emerges because the low quality brand will be a viable competing brand when the price of the high quality brand is relatively high, and at least as great as .  Then, demand for the high quality brand will be relatively elastic.  However, when the high quality product is sold for a low price, a low quality producer will not be able to compete profitably, and high quality brand demand will be less elastic.

3. ANALYSIS
Table 1 below sets out the profits available to each firm j, k, dependent on the firms’ stage one quality decisions and the number of local markets they choose to enter in the second stage.  The sunk cost of advertising in any local market, , which we take to lie in the unit interval, reduces each of the profit expressions in Table 1, and can give rise to negative profit levels.  Consequently, the analysis below identifies optimal firm strategies such that profits are maximised, stating any restrictions on the value of that are required to ensure that firms do not make losses in the SGPN equilibria of the game.

Table 1 about here

To identify the SGPN equilibria of the full game, the second stage optimal advertising strategies (that is, whether to employ advertising in one market or two) of each firm must be determined, prior to examining the optimal quality decisions to be made in the initial stage.  Hence, we begin by calculating the best advertising strategy responses of the firms, considering each homogeneous quality case, and then the differentiated quality case in turn.

Proposition 1:
When the firms produce identical products (either identical high quality or low quality products) then it will be a dominant strategy for each firm to enter only its local market in the second stage of the game.
Proof:
Consider the stage two profits if both firms produce high quality brands.  Profits are given below (Figure 1) in a normal form game matrix.

Figure 1 about here

If the non-local market is entered, Bertrand competition ensures that zero profits are obtained, and so the sunk advertising cost required to enter the market will represent a loss.  Consequently, each firm’s best response is to employ a single advertising campaign, competing only in the local market.  Similar reasoning applies when both firms produce low quality brands. 

Now consider the two firms producing quality differentiated brands.  Comparing the high quality firm’s profits from employing one or two local advertising campaigns, whatever the advertising strategy employed by the low quality firm, the high quality firm will prefer to enter its non-local market iff:
								(8)
Similarly, comparing the low quality firm’s profits from entering one or two markets, whatever the advertising strategy employed by the high quality firm, the low quality firm will prefer to enter the non-local market iff:
								(9)
Remark:
When the firms produce quality differentiated products they will each enter their non-local market in the second stage of the game if the extra profit from doing so at least offsets the sunk advertising cost incurred in entering that market.
This result is intuitive, and a product of the assumptions made regarding the firms’ production costs.

Proposition 2:
When the firms produce quality differentiated products, the low quality firm will never wish to enter both markets in the second stage of the game whilst the high quality firm wishes to enter only its local market.
Proof:
						(10)
The additional profits that accrue to the high quality good producer when it enters its non-local market are greater than those that the low quality producer can make when it enters a second market.  Consequently, the low quality producer will never be able to recoup its advertising costs of entering a second market whilst its high quality rival is unable to do so.  

Nevertheless, three possible cases remain when quality differentiated brands are produced.  Namely, both firms may wish to enter both local markets, each firm may want to enter their local market only, or the high quality producer will enter both local markets whilst its low quality rival competes only in its local market.  As each firm’s optimal advertising strategy given stage one quality choices has now been calculated, it is necessary to determine the optimal quality decisions of the firms in the initial stage of the game.  

Proposition 3:
In a two stage game in which firms must advertise to consumers, the subgame perfect Nash equilibria involve the production of homogeneous products which may be of low quality in the first stage of the game.
Proof:
The optimal quality decisions must be calculated considering each of the three feasible differentiated product stage two cases in turn.
Case 1:
If  and 
both firms will prefer to enter both markets if they produce differentiated products.  The only relevant condition is
   								(11)
as    will be trivially satisfied.

Each firm’s profits for the entire game can be presented in a normal form game matrix (Figure 2):

Figure 2 about here





has been determined above as the maximum value that  can take in this case.
Therefore, if
							(13)
it will be a best response to choose to produce a low quality product when the rival firm produces a high quality brand.  It is straightforward to check that equation 13 is never satisfied.  Hence, the best response to a competing firm’s choice to produce a high quality product is to produce an identical, high quality product.  Consumers are fully informed when differentiated products are produced as each firm advertises in both local markets.  However, when a low quality firm spends  on advertising, this expenditure is sufficiently great to ensure that the local monopoly profits from producing an identical high quality product to that of the rival are greater.

The conclusion that firms always prefer to produce identical high quality products to differentiated products is sufficient to prove that a perfect equilibrium of this game will never contain differentiated quality choices.  Even if the optimal response to a rival’s choice to produce a low quality brand was the production of a high quality brand, the low quality producer would then wish to deviate similarly to produce a high quality brand.  

The model illustrates how a concentration of firms producing similarly high quality products may arise.  However, whilst the production of identical high quality brands constitutes part of a perfect equilibrium of the game, it must also be determined whether the production of two low quality products can be part of a perfect equilibrium.  Then the model would also be able to offer an explanation for why clusters of low quality firms develop.

If firm j chooses to produce a low quality product, firm k will similarly wish to produce a low quality product iff:
							(14)
Given that  and  it is straightforward to show that there is a range of  values for which equation 14 is satisfied, where is relatively low.   Outside this range of  values the best response is to produce a quality differentiated product.  However, the low quality producer would then wish to deviate from the quality choice made, ensuring that product differentiation is not a Nash equilibrium of this subgame.

The SGPN equilibrium involving the production of identical low quality products is the most interesting to emerge in this paper.  The conclusion that in some circumstances both firms may prefer to produce low quality products is intuitive.  If the premium placed on a high quality product is low (is relatively close to unity), it may be in firms’ interests only to produce low quality products.  implies that if the firms’ optimal strategy is to produce homogeneous products, then greater profits will always be obtained from both firms producing high quality, rather than low quality products.  However, a best response to a competitor’s choice to produce a low quality product may be to produce an identical product.  This result emerges because a firm will be concerned that if it produces a differentiated, high quality brand, given that equation 11 is satisfied, each firm will spend on advertising.  This expense is sufficiently large to ensure that the second stage local monopoly profits that can be obtained from producing identical brands​[6]​ are greater than the positive profits obtained when quality differentiated brands are sold.

Profit levels must be confirmed to be non-negative, such that firms would not prefer zero advertising, demand and profits.  The lowest potential profits in the game are , accruing to both firms if they produce low quality products.  It can be shown that
  								(15)
as it is assumed throughout the analysis that .  Hence,  must be positive, given that equation 11 is satisfied.

When quality differentiated products are produced and either (Case 2) both firms wish to enter only their local market or (Case 3) only the high quality producer wishes to compete in its non-local market, then the SGPN equilibria are much more straightforward to identify.  In both cases it is a dominant strategy for each firm to produce a high quality product in the initial stage of the game.  When differentiated brands are produced and each firm only enters their local market, the low quality producer would increase profits by producing a high quality product.  Consumers are willing to pay a premium for high quality, and it is assumed that this premium is not reflected in higher production costs.  Similarly, when quality differentiated products are produced, and only the high quality producer wishes to compete in its non-local market, then the low quality firm would obtain greater profits from instead producing a high quality product, both firms then choosing only to enter their local market, enjoying local monopoly profits.  Details are provided in Appendix 2.    

It should be noted that if it is alternatively assumed that  but that otherwise the game remains unchanged, i.e. in the second stage of the game the duopolists continue to choose how many local market segments in which to compete although the sunk advertising cost of notifying consumers about the products in each local market is zero, then many of the conclusions above remain valid.  When differentiated products are produced each firm will now always want to enter both local market segments in the second stage of the game.  However, in the first stage when the firms select product quality, the results again emerge that whilst the production of identical high quality products remains part of a SGPN equilibrium, the best response to a rival’s decision to produce a low quality product can be the production of a second low quality product, if  is sufficiently close to unity.  

Alternatively, a model could be envisaged in which consumers can accurately identify product quality prior to purchase, and informative advertising is not required to increase product awareness.  In the first stage firms would select product quality, which could be accurately identified by all consumers in both local market segments.​[7]​  Firms would then sell their product in the second stage, engaging in price competition.  As it is assumed throughout this paper that consumer transport costs are negligible, each firm would only need to set up a sales outlet in one locality, although firms compete for customers throughout the market.  Interestingly, in the first stage of this model, the firms would prefer to produce differentiated products, as otherwise a Bertrand game would transpire with both firms making zero profits.​[8]​  When quality differentiated products are produced, each firm enjoys strictly positive profits.  This result duplicates the ‘principle of maximal differentiation’ of the recent vertical product differentiation literature in which typically consumers are similarly assumed to have full information, and contrasts with the minimal vertical product differentiation result obtained above when firms have to decide how many local market segments in which to enter and advertise.    

4. CONCLUSIONS
The aim of this paper has been to investigate the ‘maximal product differentiation’ outcome that has emerged in the vertical product differentiation literature when firms are assumed to engage in price competition.  The paper tests the robustness of this result in the face of consumer’ initial ignorance about brands’ qualities, which firms overcome by supplying informative advertising, concluding that the perfect equilibria of the game instead contain the production of identical brands.  

Typically, firms will produce homogeneous, high quality brands.  This result derives from the premium consumers are willing to pay for a high quality product.  The best response to a competing firm’s choice to produce a high quality brand is to mirror that quality choice.  Usually, producing a high quality product is also a best response to a competing firm’s choice to produce a low quality product, again reflecting the premium consumers are willing to pay for high quality.  Only when each firm finds it profitable to enter both local markets when differentiated products are produced, may the perfect equilibria of the game contain both firms producing low quality products.  Whilst it remains an optimal strategy to produce a high quality product if the rival firm produces a high quality brand, mirroring a low quality product choice of a competitor can also be a best response.  If the premium consumers place on high quality is relatively low, a firm will prefer to copy a low quality product choice of a rival.  Not only is the premium that consumers are willing to pay for high quality products relatively low, but the cost of advertising in both local markets must be subtracted from the profits of each firm producing a differentiated product.

When both the production of identical low quality and high quality brands are part of the perfect equilibria of the game, the firms face difficulties coordinating quality choices.  This problem can be overcome by instead assuming that firms make quality choices sequentially, and may help explain why, for example, restaurants of a similar quality are attracted to particular areas or regions.  In the model above higher profits are realised from the production of identical high quality products.  However, if an early entrant mistakenly chooses to produce a low quality product, it may be in the interests of later entrants to copy this quality choice.  Alternatively, it can be argued that when duopolists choose quality simultaneously and independently, they may recognise that there is ‘an obvious way to play’, Kreps (1990).  Whilst the firms wish to produce identical products, higher profits will be made from the production of identical high quality goods.  However, if firms’ decisions are influenced by an ‘obvious way to play’, then the production of identical low quality brands is unlikely to be realised.





Given the two conditions that define when demand for a high quality good will be non-negative when quality differentiated products are produced, it is necessary to determine the relative magnitudes of the expressions containing the price variables in order to calculate the demand curves facing each firm.
		
		
this being true from the above.  
Therefore, when , to ensure that demand for the high quality brand is positive, the following condition needs to be satisfied:
		
The demand for the high quality brand is positive if its price is less than the price of the low quality brand, plus the additional utility that a consumer receives from consuming a high quality brand rather than a low quality brand when the maximum possible level of utility from the low quality brand is being considered.











This has already been assumed to hold in Section 2.2.
In this case, the price of a low quality brand is greater than the premium consumers are willing to pay for high quality, resulting in zero demand for the low quality brand, consumers only having to choose between consuming a high quality brand and consuming nothing.  Therefore, it can be seen that here:
												
Demand functions for each differentiated brand can now be derived:
							
								
When specifying the demand function for the high quality brand, assume








The only relevant condition is
 will be trivially satisfied.
Each firm’s profits for the entire game can be presented in a normal form game matrix (Figure 3):
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The profits resulting from stage one quality choices can again be presented in a normal form game matrix (Figure 4):

Figure 4 about here

Given that in this case 
 and the maximum value of  




Table 1: Available Profits
	Product qualities selected by the firms
No. of markets entered	High, High	Low, Low	High, Low
j, k = 1			
j, k = 2			













































^1	  Bester and Petrakis (1996) suggest an alternative scenario in which different market segments represent groups of consumers loyal to particular firms.
^2	  Firms try to capture local demand before attempting to enter more (spatially) distant markets.
^3	  This assumption is also made by Grossman and Shapiro (1984).
^4	  Given that the firms are assumed, a priori, to be identical, the presence of sunk production costs would only affect firms’ decisions when full game profits are insufficient to cover this cost in addition to advertising sunk costs incurred.
^5	  Empirical support for some of the model assumptions can be found in Caves and Greene (1996).  For example, their research supports the notion that consumers are willing to pay more for higher quality brands, and that the size of advertising expenditures and brand quality are not correlated.  They also similarly assume that quality is determined prior to firms’ advertising and pricing strategies. 
^6	  Even if low quality
^7	  Whilst these are strong assumptions to make regarding consumer information, they are made only so that comparisons with the results of Section 3 can be obtained.
^8	  However, again coordination problems may hamper the achievement of this equilibrium.
